Presidents and Their Papers by McGowan, Carl
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1984
Presidents and Their Papers
Carl McGowan
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
McGowan, Carl, "Presidents and Their Papers" (1984). Minnesota Law Review. 954.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/954
Presidents and Their Papers*
Carl McGowan**
INTRODUCTION
Early in the third decade of the nineteenth century, a
twenty-five-year-old French magistrate, Alexis de Tocqueville,
came to the United States on an official mission to examine its
prison facilities. His observations of our society, however,
ranged widely beyond this limited purpose, culminating in 1835
with the publication of his book, Democracy in America,' still
considered a useful and penetrating analysis of the strengths
and weaknesses of our system of government. As to its weak-
nesses, nothing Tocqueville said continued to be more perti-
nent than these words:
[In America, no one] bothers about what was done before his time. No
method is adopted; no archives are formed; no documents are brought
together, even when it would be easy to do so. When by chance some-
one has them, he is casual about preserving them. Among my papers I
have original documents given to me by public officials to answer some
of my questions. American society seems to live from day to day, like
an army on active service.2
The actions of United States Presidents both before and af-
ter Tocqueville's visit amply support his generalization as to
America's disregard of its historical documents. Following a
precedent set by George Washington, Presidents have uni-
formly viewed any papers accumulated during their terms in
office as personal property, to be removed or even destroyed at
their will. This concept of private ownership has made collec-
tion and maintenance of presidential papers difficult and has
resulted in the loss of many historical documents.
The problem was somewhat alleviated by President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt's establishment of the first library for presiden-
tial materials3 and by passage in 1955 of the Presidential
* This paper is based on the author's William B. Lockhart Lecture
delivered October 16, 1982, at the University of Minnesota Law School.
** Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.
1. A. DE TOcQuEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (G. Lawrence trans. 1966).
2. Id. at 192.
3. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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Libraries Act.4 The Act provided an explicit legal basis for ac-
cepting any papers Presidents wished to donate. Because the
concept of private ownership remained unchallenged, however,
collection of presidential papers still depended upon the whims
of each President.
That curious and unsettling passage in our national history
known as Watergate left its mark on the problem of presiden-
tial papers. President Nixon's unsuccessful attempt to remove
documents and tapes from the White House following his resig-
nation led Congress to reexamine the principle that Presidents
possess legal ownership of those papers accumulated during
their tenure. This reexamination resulted in passage of the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Acts and,
eventually, to enactment of the Presidential Records Act of
1978,6 which sought to resolve the question of legal ownership
of presidential documents.
This paper traces the development and modification of the
concept of private ownership of presidential papers. It first
summarizes the historical development of the concept and re-
sultant problems. Next, it traces former President Nixon's role
in prompting congressional reexamination of the private own-
ership concept and enactment of the Presidential Recordings
and Materials Preservation Act. Further examined are Presi-
dent Nixon's legal challenges to the Act, as well as other early
litigation, none of which resolved the private ownership ques-
tion. Finally, this paper delineates Congress's attempt to re-
solve the question of private ownership through passage of the
Presidential Records Act, and describes the problems that
remain.
I. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS
A. THE CONCEPT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
Beginning with George Washington, Presidents have as-
sumed that papers accumulated during their tenure in office
are their personal property. Upon completing his term in office,
Washington took the bulk of his personal papers with him to
4. Pub. L. No. 373, 69 Stat 695 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2107-
2108 (1976)).
5. Pub. L No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695-99, 1701 (codified as amended at 44
U.S.C. §§ 2107 note, 3315-3324 (1976)).
6. Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (Supp.
V 1981)).
[Vol. 68:409
PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS
Mount Vernon. 7 Although he apparently gave some thought to
building a separate facility on his estate to house his papers,
this prospect was terminated by his early death. In his will,
Washington devised his papers to his nephew, Supreme Court
Justice Bushrod Washington. 8
Justice Washington proved unthinkingly generous in pro-
viding access to those papers. His lack of discretion in this re-
gard resulted in widespread dispersal of the papers, so much
so, indeed, that much of "the public's heritage ended up in pri-
vate hands."9 Most of what remained in Justice Washington's
hands-mainly official records-were sold in 1834 by his
nephew and heir, George Corbin Washington, to the United
States government for $25,000.10 Fifteen years later, Congress
purchased the late President's remaining private papers from
the same source for $20,000.11
In making these purchases, Congress apparently assumed
that the papers were privately owned. United States Presi-
dents following Washington shared that view, removing their
papers either upon departing from the White House or immedi-
ately thereafter.12 Congress strengthened this assumption by
purchasing additional presidential papers from their "owners,"
usually Presidents' heirs.'3
The assumption of private ownership made the collection
and preservation of presidential records a difficult task. For ex-
ample, one hundred separate acquisitions were made in the
course of the government's efforts to acquire the scattered
holdings of the papers of Andrew Jackson.' 4 Furthermore, the
private ownership concept presented a real threat to the physi-
7. See Berman, The Evolution and Value of Presidential Libraries, in THE
PRESIDENCY AND INFORMATION POLCY 80 (H. Relyea ed. 1981).
8. Id. at 81.
9. Id.
10. Id. For a discussion of President Washington's treatment of his pa-
pers, see McDonough, Hoxie & Jacobs, Who Outs Presidential Papers?, 27 MAN-
uscmPrTs 2 (1975).
11. Berman, supra note 7, at 81.
12. See Fridley, Should Public Papers Be Private Property', 44 MINN. HIST.
37 (1974).
13. Id. For example, the bulk of Thomas Jefferson's papers were
purchased in 1848 by the Department of State from the President's executor,
Thomas Jefferson Randolph, for $20,000. Congress appropriated $20,000 to
purchase James Monroe's papers in 1849. Dolly Madison, James Madison's
widow, sold a portion of his papers to the Department of State in 1837 for
$25,000 and a second installment in 1848 for the same amount. Hirshon, The
Scope, Accessibility and History of Presidential Papers, 1 GoVT PUBLICATIONS
REV. 363, 378-79 (1974).
14. Berman, supra note 7, at 81.
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cal integrity of these invaluable records. Most of William
Henry Harrison's papers went up in flames when the Harrison
home in North Bend, Ohio, accidentally burned down.15 The
fortunes of war accounted for a substantial loss of John Tyler's
papers when Richmond, Virginia, was burned in 1865.16
Some presidential papers were destroyed on purpose
rather than by accident.17 Franklin Pierce apparently de-
stroyed the papers from his four years in office.18 Shortly
before his death, Chester A. Arthur ordered the bulk of his offi-
cial and personal papers burned.19 Mrs. Warren G. Harding at-
tempted to destroy all of her husband's correspondence,
though her efforts were not entirely successful.20 Robert Todd
Lincoln was caught destroying his father's Civil War
correspondence.2 '
The attitude taken by nineteenth-century Presidents re-
garding ownership of presidential papers is nowhere better il-
lustrated than by Grover Cleveland's response to a Senate
request for an executive file:
I regard the papers and documents withheld and addressed to me or
intended for my use and action purely unofficial and private, not infre-
quently confidential, and having reference to the performance of a duty
exclusively mine.... I suppose if I desired to take them into my cus-
tody I might do so with entire propriety, and if I saw fit to destroy them
no one could complain. 2 2
An additional hindrance to the collection and preservation
of presidential papers was the absence of an appropriate official
depository. Presidents who might have been inclined to leave
their papers to the public were dissuaded from doing so by the
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. I am indebted to Paul T. Heffron, Assistant Chief of the Library of Con-
gress, Manuscript Division, for clarification of some of the details on presiden-
tial destruction of records, and for information with respect to the Library's
acquisitions in this area.
18. Berman, supra note 7, at 82.
19. Hirshon, supra note 13, at 385.
20. Berman, supra note 7, at 82.
21. Id. An heir of President Washington was more well-meaning if only
slightly less destructive:
I am now cutting up fragments from old letters & accounts, some of
1760 ... to supply the call for Any thing that bears the impress of his
venerated hand. One of my correspondents says send me only the dot
of an i or the cross of a t, made by his hand, & I will be content.
Letter from George Washington Parke Curtis to John Pickett (Apr. 17, 1857),
quoted in INDEX TO THE GEORGE WASHINGTON PAPERS XVI (1964).
22. Letter from President Grover Cleveland to the United States Senate
(Mar. 1, 1886), reprinted in 8 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS, 1787-1897, at 378 (J. Richardson ed. 1900).
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lack of any designated collection site. For example, President
Benjamin Harrison, bequeathing his papers to his wife, said in
his will that he had intended to keep his papers intact and ulti-
mately available for historical research, but there was, as he
put it, "no suitable place or organization ... now available
here."2
3
This perceived difficulty was greatly mitigated in 1897 by
the establishment of the Manuscript Division of the Library of
Congress. 24 The Manuscript Division presently embraces a sig-
nificant portion of the papers of twenty-three Presidents, from
George Washington to Calvin Coolidge.25 These papers have
come into the government's possession both by purchase and
by gift. Theodore Roosevelt and his heirs deposited papers
with this facility, as did William Howard Taft and his family.26
Mrs. Woodrow Wilson donated her husband's papers to the
Manuscript Division fifteen years after his death.27
The private ownership principle, however, has impaired the
completeness of these collections and their accessibility to the
public. Presidents have asserted their power of ownership to
select and to limit access to the papers actually deposited.
When Calvin Coolidge returned to private life in 1929, he gave
to the Manuscript Division a large number of his papers, but
his widow and his secretary subsequently admitted that Presi-
dent Coolidge had voluntarily destroyed many papers before
delivery.28 Woodrow Wilson's papers could not be seen without
his widow's consent until her death in 1961,29 and the papers of
Benjamin Harrison and William Howard Taft also were circum-
scribed by a requirement of prior family permission until 1945
and 1953, respectively.30 President Lincoln's papers were not
opened until 1947, eighty-two years after his death.31
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES
The presidential library ushered in a new era in the care of
presidential papers. Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first to es-
23. WILLS OF THE U.S. PRESIDENTS 151 (H. Collins & D. Weaver eds. 1976).
24. McDonough, Hoxie & Jacobs, supra note 10, at 5.
25. Berman, supra note 7, at 82.
26. Hirshon, supra note 13, at 386.
27. See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL STuDY COMMISSION ON RECORDS
AND DOCUMENTS OF FEDERAL OFFICAIS 13 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL
REPORT]; Hirshon, supra note 13, at 386.
28. FINAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 13.
29. Id.
30. Id.; Hirshon, supra note 13, at 385.
31. Hirshon, supra note 13, at 383.
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tablish such a library,32 and his example was later followed by
his predecessor, Herbert Hoover.33 Each President thereafter
has sought to establish a presidential library and, with the ex-
ception of Presidents Nixon and Carter,34 each now has such a
library.
The presidential library has been a response by latter-day
incumbents of the office not only to the importance of preserv-
ing our historical heritage, but also to the sheer magnitude of
the materials involved. This increase in materials mirrors the
enormous increase this century has seen in the scope of the
functions of the Executive Branch. President Grant's staff
numbered six persons, with an annual budget of $13,800; as re-
cently as President Coolidge's time, only forty-six people
worked immediately for the President, on a budget of $93,500.35
The Executive Office of the President, created in 1939, has
caused an enormous growth of the Presidency by placing nu-
merous agencies under the President's direct power.36 By 1971
its staff was in excess of 5,000 persons, and in fiscal 1973 its
budget exceeded $64,000,000.37
Not surprisingly, the number of papers Presidents accumu-
late has grown accordingly. Presidential papers collections
have burgeoned from Herbert Hoover's 1,300,000 pages for four
years to Lyndon Johnson's 18,000,000 pages for five years and
Richard Nixon's 46,000,000 pages for six years.38 The pressures
these collections have generated upon federal archival re-
sources are almost intolerable, mandating separate facilities for
their individual administration.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 39-40.
33. "The Hoover Presidential Library was established at West Branch,
Iowa .... Funds to erect the building were provided by The Hoover Birth-
place Foundation." Hirshon, supra note 13, at 387.
34. However, plans have been made and sites selected for the Carter li-
brary in Atlanta, Georgia, see N.Y. Times, July 16, 1982, at B4, col 5, and the
Nixon library in San Clemente, California, see N.Y. Times, May 28, 1983, at A6,
col. 1.
35. J. KALLANBACH, THE AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTVE 440-41 (1966).
36. Exec. Order No. 8248, 3 C.F.R. 576 (1938-43 comp.). The order set up the
Executive Office of the President, staffed with six administrative assistants.
The President made the crucial decision to transfer the Bureau of the Budget
from the Treasury to the Executive Office where it rapidly grew to become the
"general staff" to the entire executive branch. See W. GoLDsMrrH, THE GROWTH
OF PRESMENTIAL POWER 1532-33 (1974). Subsequently, key agencies such as the
Council of Economic Advisors, the National Security Council, and the Central
Intelligence Agency were moved into the Executive Office of the President. Id.
at 1415, 1848.
37. 118 CONG. REC. 21,512-13 (1972) (statement of Alan C. Swan, Ass't Vice
Pres., U. of Chicago).
38. FINAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 14.
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On President Roosevelt's initiative, a joint congressional
resolution in 193939 authorized the United States Archivist to
receive Roosevelt's papers, as well as related historical materi-
als donated by other persons. Under the resolution, these
materials were to be administered in a building to be erected
with private funds on sixteen acres of land Roosevelt donated
from his Hyde Park estate.40 By the Presidential Libraries Act
of 1955,41 Congress authorized similar dispositions of other
Presidents' papers.
The establishment of presidential libraries, however, had
no effect on the question of private ownership of presidential
materials. Roosevelt's transfer of papers to his library was
viewed as a gift.4 2 The Presidential Libraries Act only provided
for acceptance of any papers a President voluntarily chose to
leave with the United States Archivist, subject to any restric-
tions the President deemed appropriate; it did not establish
government ownership of the materials.43 Thus, the assump-
tion that Presidents own their personal papers was not
changed by this statute, nor was it to change for another
twenty-three years.44
II. CONGRESSIONAL EXAMINATION OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP
A. PRESIDENTIAL RECORDINGS AND MATERIALS PRESERVATION
ACT
When President Richard Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974,
39. S.J. Res. 118, 53 Stat. 1062 (1939).
40. Berman, supra note 7, at 83.
41. Pub. I- No. 373, 69 Stat. 695 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2107-
2108 (1976)).
42. Id. H.G. Jones, however, noted that "Roosevelt made his most signifi-
cant departure ... by recognizing the paramount right of the public and by
subordinating this private claim to public custody, support, and management
under the direction of civil servants governed by professional standards. This
... fell short of the natural and logical goal. But it was a long, unprecedented
step forward that no president thenceforth would be likely to disregard." H.G.
JONES, THE RECORDS OF A NATION 147 (1969).
43. See 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1976). The Act allowed the President to leave his
documents with the United States Archivist; it did not require that the docu-
ments be turned over.
44. This is not to say that the assumption of presidential ownership had
previously gone unquestioned. Indeed, in 1969 a study of the American Histori-
cal Association called the notion "a lingering vestige of the attributes of monar-
chy, not an appropriate or compatible concept ... for the head of a democratic
state." Fridley, supra note 12, at 37. Earlier conclusions to the same effect are
set out in Cook, Private Papers of Public Officials, 38 AM. ARCHrVIST 300-01
(1975).
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he avowedly intended to take with him the over 40,000,000
pages of documents and 880 tape recordings he had accumu-
lated while in office.45 Government archivists even began to
collect these materials and pack them for shipment to a govern-
ment facility near his California home. When the Watergate
Special- Prosecutor expressed his continuing need for these
materials, however, the new Ford administration, after negotia-
tions with Judge Sirica, the Justice Department, and the Spe-
cial Prosecutor, ordered preparations for shipment of the
documents stopped.46 Simultaneously, President Ford asked
for his Attorney General's opinion as to the ownership of these
materials. Attorney General Saxbe responded that the practice
of former Presidents, and the absence of any statute to the con-
trary, generally supported ownership by the President.47
Thereafter, on September 7, 1974, General Services Admin-
istrator Arthur F. Sampson entered into an agreement with Mr.
Nixon under which the ex-President retained "all legal and eq-
uitable title" to the materials, which were to be "deposited tem-
porarily" near the Nixon home in California, but in an "existing
facility belonging to the United States."4 The agreement
stated Mr. Nixon's intention to "donate" the materials to the
United States, subject to "appropriate restrictions."4 9 No one
was to have access to the materials except Mr. Nixon and the
United States Archivist upon Nixon's authorization.0 Mr.
Nixon agreed "not to withdraw from deposit any originals of
the Materials" for a period of three years, after which he could
exercise 'the right to withdraw from deposit without formality
any or all of the Materials... and to retain... [them] for any
purpose."51
The agreement made special provision for the tape record-
ings; they were to be donated to the United States "effective
September 1, 1979."52 In the meantime, the recordings were to
remain deposited with Nixon's papers, although only Mr. Nixon
45. See FmAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 9.
46. Id.
47. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1 (Sept. 6, 1974).
48. Letter of Agreement Between Former President Nixon and the Admin-
istrator of General Services, 10 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1104, 1104 (Sept. 8,
1974).
49. Id.
50. Id. It does not appear that the Archivist played any role in the negotia-
tion of the agreement, and he apparently had no advance knowledge of it. See
id. at 1104-05.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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(or persons he authorized) was to have access to them.53 Of
critical importance was a provision that, after September 1,
1979, "the Administrator shall destroy such tapes as [Mr.
Nixon] may direct" and in any event the tapes "shall be de-
stroyed at the time of [Mr. Nixon's] death or on September 1,
1984, whichever event shall first occur."5 4 The tapes were
otherwise not to be withdrawn, and reproduction of them could
be made only by "mutual agreement."5 5
Congressional reaction to the public announcement of this
agreement was as speedy as it was emphatic. Within ten days
a bill was introduced which was designed, among other things,
to abrogate the so-called Nixon-Sampson agreement.56 Legisla-
tive action on the bill was complete by December 9, 1974, and it
was signed into law by President Ford ten days later.5 7
The statute was called the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act.58 Title I, specifically aimed at Mr.
Nixon, directed the Administrator of General Services, notwith-
standing any agreement or law to the contrary, to seize and re-
tain possession of the tape recordings and the other
documentary materials accumulated during the Nixon adminis-
tration.59 These materials were not to be destroyed except as
might later be provided by law.60 Subject to applicable de-
fenses or privileges, these documents were to be available in
response to subpoena or other legal process, with priority ac-
corded to the Watergate Special Prosecutor.6 1 Mr. Nixon, or his
designee, was to have access to the documents for any purpose
consistent with the Act.62 The Administrator's immediate task
under the Act was to issue regulations covering these matters,
and, most important, to screen the materials to determine
53. Id. at 1104-05.
54. Id. at 1104.
55. Id. at 1105.
56. See S. REP. No. 1181, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. REP. No. 1182, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). For a discussion of the legislative history of the bill, see
Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 430, 439-445 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
57. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
526, 88 Stat. 1695-99, 1701 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2107 note, 3315-
3324 (1976)). The statute is divided into two titles: title I, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note,
addresses the disposal of the Nixon presidential papers; title I, 44 U.S.C.
§§ 3315-3324, establishes the National Study Commission on Records and Docu-
ments of Federal Officials.
58. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2107 note, 3315-3324 (1976).
59. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act § 101, 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 note (1976).
60. Id. § 102(a).
61. Id. § 102(b).
62. Id. § 102(c).
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which were official and which were personal. Those deter-
mined to be personal were to be returned to Mr. Nixon.63 Con-
gressional approval of these initial regulations was not
required.
Under the terms of the Act, eventual public access to any
materials the Administrator permanently retained was to be
governed by regulations promulgated by the Administrator.6 4
These proposed regulations were to be submitted initially to
Congress where either the House or the Senate could, by reso-
lution within ninety days, disapprove them. 65 In formulating
such regulations, the Act directed the Administrator to take
into account seven enumerated factors.66
The Act provided that the question of whether Mr. Nixon
or the government owned the materials was to be determined
by the judiciary in the first instance.67 If that determination
was in Mr. Nixon's favor, then Congress was to be understood
as condemning the documents for a public use, and the courts
would adjudicate fair compensation.68
B. CHALLENGES TO THE ACT
1. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services
One day after the Presidential Recordings and Materials
63. Id. §104(a)(7).
64. Id. § 104(a).
65. Id. § 104(b) (1); see infra note 116.
66. Section 104(a) of the Act set out the factors:
(1) the need to provide the public with the full truth, at the earli-
est reasonable date, of the abuses of governmental power popularly
identified under the generic term 'Watergate';
(2) the need to make such recordings and materials available for
use in judicial proceedings;
(3) the need to prevent general access, except in accordance with
appropriate procedures established for use in judicial proceedings, to
information relating to the Nation's security;
(4) the need to protect every individual's right to a fair and impar-
tial trial;
(5) the need to protect any party's opportunity to assert any le-
gally or constitutionally based right or privilege which would prevent
or otherwise limit access to such recordings and materials;
(6) the need to provide public access to those materials which
have general historical significance, and which are not likely to be re-
lated to the need described in paragraph (1); and
(7) the need to give to Richard M. Nixon, or his heirs, for his sole
custody and use, tape recordings and other materials which are not
likely to be related to the need described in paragraph (1) and are not
otherwise of general historical significance.
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act § 104(a), 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 note (1976).
67. Id. § 105(a).
68. Id. § 105(c). See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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Act became law, Mr. Nixon challenged its constitutionality in a
suit filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.69 The Act gave this court exclusive jurisdiction to
hear constitutional challenges to the Act, as well as assertions
of the invalidity of any regulation issued under it; to decide
questions of title, ownership, possession, or control of any tape
or document; and to award just compensation if the court de-
termined that the Act had deprived any individual of private
property.70
Because the Act's constitutionality was assailed, a special
three-judge district court was convened.71 That court con-
cluded that because no regulations governing public access had
yet been issued, only the issue of the Act's alleged facial un-
constitutionality was appropriate for immediate resolution.7 2
So limited, the court's inquiry focused upon the facial validity
of the Act's provisions requiring the Administrator to take the
tapes and documents into government custody for immediate
screening by government archivists. 3 The district court, as
later characterized by the Supreme Court, "comprehensively
canvassed all the claims, and in a thorough opinion, concluded
that none had merit."74
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of Mr.
Nixon's subsequent appeal7 5 and, in an opinion issued June 28,
1977, affirmed the district court.76 The Court accepted the dis-
trict court's concept of the restricted scope of review appropri-
ate under existing circumstances, noting that no regulations
governing public access had yet become effective.7 7 The
69. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1976)
(three-judge court). For a discussion of issues raised by title I of the Act, see
Note, Government Control of Richard Nixon's Presidential Material, 87 YALE
L.J. 1601-35 (1978).
70. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act § 105, 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 note (1976).
71. The three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2282 (1970) (repealed Aug. 12, 1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970).
72. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. at 334-340.
73. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act § 103, 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 note (1976).
74. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 439 (1977).
75. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 429 U.S. 976 (1976) (prob. juris.
noted).
76. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
77. Id. at 437-39. The Senate had disapproved the first set of regulations
the Administrator submitted, as well as seven provisions of a second set of reg-
ulations later withdrawn in its entirety. The House of Representatives had dis-
approved several provisions of a third set. At the time of the Supreme Court's
decision, the Administrator was preparing a fourth set of regulations.
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Supreme Court determined, as had the district court, that the
validity of any regulations would depend on their precise na-
ture and that mere speculation as to their possible nature was
not a proper basis for present adjudication. 78
The Supreme Court considered each of five contentions
made by Mr. Nixon, preliminarily rejecting certain intervenors'
claims that only an incumbent President had standing to
charge that the Act violated the constitutional concepts of sepa-
ration of powers and executive privilege.79 Addressing Mr.
Nixon's claims on their merits, however, the Court found his ar-
guments unavailing.
As to the separation-of-powers claim, the Court regarded as
relevant that neither President Ford, who had signed the Act,
nor President Carter, whose Solicitor General was before the
Court vigorously urging the Act's validity, supported Mr.
Nixon's position.80 Rejecting the argument that the Constitu-
tion contemplates a complete division of authority among the
three branches of government, the Court evoked settled doc-
trine that the Framers of the Constitution had not intended
that the separate powers were "to operate with absolute inde-
pendence."81 Moreover, the Court adopted the district court's
interpretation that the Act assured every party the opportunity
to be informed in advance of any proposed release of papers,
and guaranteed the chance to seek judicial review of any le-
gally or constitutionally based right or privilege.82 The Court
held that the "custody and screening of the materials within
the Executive Branch itself" was less intrusive than to have
Congress or some outside agency perform the screening func-
tion, and combined with other safeguards, "plainly guard[s]
against disclosures barred by any defenses or privileges avail-
able to the appellant or the Executive Branch."8 3 Additionally,
the Court noted the "abundant statutory precedent for the reg-
ulation and mandatory disclosure of documents in the posses-
sion of the Executive Branch," citing as examples the Freedom
of Information Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, the Government in
the Sunshine Act, the Federal Records Act, and others, such as
78. Id. at 438-39.
79. Id. at 439, 448-49.
80. Id. at 441.
81. Id. at 443 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
82. Id. at 444.
83. Id.
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those relating to census records and tax returns.84
The Court took pains to state that it saw "no reason to en-
gage in debate [over] whether [Mr. Nixon] has legal title to the
materials." The Court felt justified in ignoring this issue be-
cause the Act assured Mr. Nixon of just compensation if his
economic interests were invaded, and because having legal title
would not immunize his papers from any regulation considered
to be in the public interest.8 5
The Court next turned to the "more narrowly defined claim
that the Presidential privilege shields these records from archi-
val scrutiny."86 In United States v. Nixon87.-the famous Nixon
tapes case-the Court had recognized the existence of such a
privilege, but held that the privilege yielded to the needs of the
judicial branch.88 In the instant case, however, Mr. Nixon was
asserting the privilege against the Executive Branch itself, in-
sisting that any breach in this case would "adversely affect the
ability of future Presidents to obtain the candid advice neces-
sary for effective decisionmaking." 89 Once again, the Court
thought it significant that neither President Ford nor President
Carter had supported Mr. Nixon's claim.9 0 Conceiving that it
was dealing only with "the bare claim that the mere screening
of the materials by the archivists will impermissibly interfere
with candid communication of views by Presidential advis-
ers,"91 the Court found the question easy to resolve. Re-
marking that Mr. Nixon had not "called into question the
District Court's finding that the archivists' 'record for discretion
in handling confidential materials is unblemished,' "92 and find-
ing adequate justifications for "this limited intrusion into exec-
utive confidentiality,"93 the Court concluded that the Act on its
face did not violate presidential privilege.9 4
Mr. Nixon founded his third challenge upon the fundamen-
tal rights of expression and privacy guaranteed by the first,
fourth, and fifth amendments to the United States Constitution;
84. Id. at 445.
85. Id. at 445 n.8.
86. Id. at 446.
87. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
88. Id. at 713.
89. 433 U.S. at 450.
90. Id. at 449. See supra text accompanying note 69.
91. 433 U.S. at 451.
92. Id. at 451-52 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F.
Supp. 321, 347 (D.D.C. 1976) (three-judge court)).
93. Id. at 452.
94. Id. at 455.
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although he admittedly surrendered some privacy when he en-
tered public life, he argued that his private and personal mat-
ters unrelated to his official duties deserved protection.9 5 The
Court pointed out, however, that a principal purpose of the
screening process, as directed by Congress in the Act, was to
identify and to return to Mr. Nixon any such personal items. 96
Conceding to Nixon a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
personal communications, the Court nevertheless concluded:
The constitutionality of the Act must be viewed in the context of the
limited intrusion of the screening process, of [Mr. Nixon's] status as a
public figure, of his lack of any expectation of privacy in the over-
whelming majority of the materials ... and of the virtual impossibility
of segregating the small quantity of private materials without compre-
hensive screening.9
7
These circumstances, when considered together with the vital
public purposes animating Congress to legislate as it did,
prompted the Court to find Nixon's privacy claim without
merit.98
Nixon derived his fourth contention from his position as
head of a national political party, which had necessitated his
devoting a significant amount of his working time during his
presidency to partisan political matters.99 Consequently, he ar-
gued that since his papers included records relating to these
political activities, any archival screening would necessarily in-
vade rights of associational privacy and political speech pro-
tected by the first amendment. 08
In the Court's view, however, this claim was to be mea-
sured by the inescapable fact that "no less restrictive way than
archival screening has been suggested as a means for identifi-
cation of materials to be returned to [Mr. Nixon]."101 The
Court characterized the extent of any such burden on Mr.
Nixon as "speculative" in view of the Act's protections against
improper public disclosures and provision for judicial review;
in any event, any burden was outweighed by the important gov-
ernmental interests the Act advanced.l0 2 Moreover, the Court
was not impressed by Mr. Nixon's concern for the Act's inhib-
iting effect on the political activity of future Presidents, which
95. Id. at 455-57.
96. Id. at 460.
97. Id. at 465.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 465-66.
100. Id. at 466.
101. Id. at 467.
102. Id. at 467-68.
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he claimed would thereby reduce the quantity and diversity of
the political speech and association the nation would receive
from its leaders.103 The Court dismissed such concern with the
single comment that it had not deterred President Ford from
giving his approval to the law or President Carter from defend-
ing it in court.1l 4
Mr. Nixon's last constitutional contention was that the Act
constituted a bill of attainder and therefore fell within the pro-
scription in article I, section 9 of the Constitution against any
law that legislatively determines guilt and imposes punishment
upon an identifiable individual without a judicial trial.105 Mr.
Nixon submitted that Congress had acted on the premise that
he had engaged in "misconduct," was an "unreliable custodian"
of his own papers, and was deserving of a "legislative judgment
of blameworthiness." 0 6 This argument was in some respects
similar to the equal protection claim he had raised unsuccess-
fully in the district court but which, although included in the
jurisdictional statement, was not pressed in the Supreme
Court.107 The Supreme Court expressly noted this similarity
by saying that "[h]owever expansive the prohibition against
bills of attainder, it surely was not intended to serve as a vari-
ant of the equal protection doctrine, invalidating every Act of
Congress or the States that legislatively burdens some persons
as groups but not all other plausible individuals."108 In particu-
lar, the district court had earlier concluded that article I, sec-
tion 9 does not limit Congress "to the choice of legislating for
the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not legislating at
all."109
The Supreme Court found a number of reasons justifying
Congress's decision to limit the Act's immediate reach to Presi-
dent Nixon's papers. First, only those papers needed immedi-
ate attention, since the papers of all former Presidents from
Hoover to Johnson were reposing in presidential libraries. Fur-
thermore, Congress had special-and ample-reason to be con-
cerned about the preservation of the Nixon materials because
103. Id. at 468.
104. Id. See supra notes 80, 90, and accompanying text.
105. Article I provides: "No Bill of Attainder... shall be passed... ." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
106. 433 U.S. at 468 (emphasis deleted).
107. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 369-71
(D.D.C. 1976) (three-judge court); 45 U.S.L.W. 3076 (U.S. July 27, 1976) (ques-
tions presented).
108. 433 U.S. at 471 (footnotes omitted).
109. Id.
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he alone had entered into an agreement which, by its terms,
called for the destruction of some of them. "In short," said the
Court, "[Mr. Nixon] constituted a legitimate class of one,"
thereby justifying Congress's decision "to proceed with dis-
patch with respect to his materials while accepting the status
of his predecessors' papers and ordering the further considera-
tion of generalized standards to govern his successors."1 10 Al-
ternatively, the Court held that the Act's commitment of the
Nixon materials to the custody of, and to screening by, govern-
ment archivists pending further regulations governing public
access did not constitute an infliction of punishment within the
constitutional proscription of bills of attainder."'
2. Nixon v. Freeman
On December 16, 1977, the General Services Administration
announced that regulations governing public access to the
Nixon presidential materials had finally become effective after
several earlier proposed regulations were rejected.112 Shortly
thereafter, Mr. Nixon sued the Administrator in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia to invalidate
certain of the regulations.113 The court granted defendant-in-
tervenor status to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, the American Historical Association, the American Polit-
ical Science Association, and a number of individual journalists
and scholars.114 On February 14, 1979, after prolonged settle-
ment negotiations, an agreement was reached which called for
amendments to the regulations and, in addition, disposed of all
but two of Mr. Nixon's challenges." 5 The agreement also pro-
vided that neither side would rely on the Act's one-House veto
provision to argue either for or against the constitutionality of
the regulations." 6 The revised regulations resulting from the
110. Id. at 472.
111. Id.
112. See 42 Fed. Reg. 63,626 (1977) (codified as amended at 41 C.F.R. § 105.63
(1983)); supra notes 53-56, 66, and accompanying text.
113. See Nixon v. Freeman, 670 F.2d 346, 349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 445 (1982). The district court opinion was not reported.
114. See id. at 349.
115. See id. at 349-50.
116. See id. at 350 n.5. Officials who served under President Nixon, how-
ever, did challenge the regulations as unconstitutional because of the one-
House veto provision. On December 30, 1983, Federal District Court Judge
Thomas F. Hogan held the regulations invalid because the Presidential Record-
ings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 under which they were promul-
gated authorized either house of Congress to veto them. Allen v. Carmen, No.
83-3099 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 1983). Judge Hogan's ruling was based on the Supreme
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agreement became effective, without veto by either House, on
March 7, 1980.117
The two issues not subject to the settlement agreement
were the subject of cross-motions for summary judgment in the
district court, which ruled against Mr. Nixon.118 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
was confronted with these two issues, as well as with a claim
that the district court had abused its discretion by denying fur-
ther discovery after submission of cross-motions for
judgment.119
Mr. Nixon first complained of the regulation's providing
that the public may listen to, although not make reproductions
of, reference copies of his tape recordings at the National
Archives in Washington and at eleven other archival centers
around the country. Mr. Nixon asserted that this regulation vi-
olated various personal privacy interests, as well as the presi-
dential privilege of confidentiality. The Act's Administrator, he
alleged, not only could use, but was required by the Constitu-
tion to use, less intrusive means of making this information
available to the public. Mr. Nixon suggested allowing public ac-
cess only to synopses or transcripts of the tapes, limiting public
availability to the Watergate tapes alone, or restricting the
availability of the Nixon tapes for a fixed period of time, such
as twenty-five years or until the death of the participants in the
recorded conversations.120
Mr. Nixon's second challenge related to the procedure by
which the archivists planned to screen and identify tapes con-
taining his personal diary.12' Clearly, diary material was to be
returned to him as "private or personal" material, 122 which the
regulations defined as "relating solely to a person's family or
other non-governmental activities, including private political
associations, and having no connection with his constitutional
or statutory powers or duties as President."'123 Such material
Court's decision six months earlier in INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), in
which the Court held a one-House veto unconstitutional. Allen v. Carmen, slip
op. at 31-46. Judge Hogan's ruling blocked the plans by the government to give
the public access to 1.5 million documents from the Nixon Administration. Id.
at 45-46.
117. 670 F.2d at 350. See 41 C.F.R. § 105.63 (1983).
118. See 670 F.2d at 350.
119. Id. at 346.
120. Id. at 353-54.
121. Id. at 359-62.
122. 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.401(a) (1983).
123. Id. § 105-63.401(b).
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could include a private diary even though it contained matters
of general historical significance or recounted some events re-
lated to a President's official duties.124
What the archivists essentially proposed to do was to listen
to the dictabelts or other tapes to the extent necessary to deter-
mine whether they were personal diary records. If an introduc-
tory phrase or certain portions of a tape revealed it to be a
diary, the review would proceed no further. On occasion, how-
ever, the archivists might find it necessary to listen longer in
order to be sure of their determination, mindful always that the
regulations required the taking of all reasonable steps "to mini-
mize the degree of intrusion into private or personal
materials."125
Not persuaded that the district court had erred in holding
for the government, the court of appeals affirmed, in an opinion
issued in February 1982.126 The Supreme Court denied certio-
rari.127 Presumably, now that the legal questions have been re-
solved, the final processing of these materials can go forward to
completion in accordance with the Act.128
III. JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
The question of the legal ownership of presidential docu-
ments, however, remains in limbo, a legal question which for
lack of controlling judicial authority has remained unresolved
since the beginning of the Republic. The relevant cases are, at
best, tangential in their impact. In 1841, Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Story, sitting on a federal circuit court, upheld the va-
lidity of a copyright on official letters George Washington had
written while he was President.129 These were the same letters
that Washington had bequeathed to his nephew, Justice
Bushrod Washington, and that Congress had later purchased-
seven years before the copyright case arose.130 Before Con-
gress bought the letters, however, Chief Justice Marshall and
Jared Sparks had acquired an interest in the letters and Sparks
had published a twelve-volume work reprinting many of
124. 670 F.2d at 361.
125. 41 C.F.R. § 105.63.401-2(a) (1983).
126. Nixon v. Freeman, 670 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
445 (1982).
127. 103 S. Ct. 445 (1982).
128. For a discussion of the continuing attempts to block release of the doc-
uments, see supra note 116.
129. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
130. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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them.131 The circuit court's decision held only that Sparks's
copyright in the work barred private parties from pirating the
materials for sale; although this established that Washington
initially had one form of ownership of his official papers, the
court further held that this was not an ownership right that
could be asserted against the government.132 Congress could
publish the papers over the copyright holder's objection, Story
said, or could require that the documents be kept secret if cir-
cumstances required.133
Many years later a state trial court in New York upheld the
validity of Franklin D. Roosevelt's transfer of his presidential
materials to the government in connection with the creation of
his presidential library. 34 The court so ruled, however, without
defining precisely the nature of the interests that Roosevelt
purported to convey.135
The Twin Cities, Minneapolis and St. Paul, was the locale
more than twenty-five years ago of the litigation which cen-
tered most squarely on the question of who owns papers cre-
ated by a federal employee in the discharge of official duties.
The papers in issue could possibly be regarded as presidential
in nature since they were brought into being upon the explicit
order of President Thomas Jefferson and in accordance with his
detailed instructions.
President Jefferson had long been fascinated by the vast
Louisiana Territory which stretched from the Mississippi River
to the Continental Divide-so much so, indeed, that he compro-
mised his strict constitutional constructionism somewhat when
the opportunity arose to buy the Territory from Napoleon. 36
Even before the Louisiana Purchase was consummated, Jeffer-
son mounted an expedition to explore the territory acquired
and the Northwest country beyond, selecting Captains Mer-
iwether Lewis and William Clark as the leaders of this venture.
In an 1803 letter of instructions to Lewis, who was also Jeffer-
131. Marshall was allowed to use the original papers from 1804 to 1807, while
writing his Life of George Washington. Washington's nephew gave Jared
Sparks, editor of the North American Review, permission to use eight boxes of
the former President's papers to help Sparks prepare The Writings of George
Washington, published in 1858. These eight boxes remained in Sparks's pos-
session for the next ten years. Berman, supra note 7, at 81.
132. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 347 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
133. Id.
134. In re Roosevelt's Will, 190 Misc. 341, 73 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
135. Id.
136. See E.S. BROWN, THE CONsTrruTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA
PURCHASE 1803-1812, at 23-29 (2d ed. 1972).
19831
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
son's private secretary, Jefferson wrote: "Your observations are
to be taken with great pains & accuracy, to be entered distinctly
& intelligibly for others as well as yourself... In re-entering
the U.S. and reaching a place of safety ... repair yourself with
your papers to the seat of government."' 37
One hundred fifty years later, in St. Paul, Minnesota, a
granddaughter of General John Henry Hammond, while pre-
paring to close her mother's house after her death, came across
numerous old papers in the General's desk in the attic. Con-
cluding that some of the documents might be of historical inter-
est, she invited the Minnesota Historical Society to send
someone over to look at them.138 The curator who came found
some papers interesting and apparently asked for-and re-
ceived-permission to take them back to the Society for more
careful examination.139 Two months later the St. Paul Dispatch
carried a front-page story to the effect that the Society had ac-
quired "a priceless collection of papers" and identified them as
"long-missing papers covering the first 1,600 miles of the famed
Lewis and Clark expedition." 4o There were sixty-seven sepa-
rate pieces of paper, mainly in Captain Clark's handwriting, but
with a few insertions by Captain Lewis.141
Members of the Hammond family were not only surprised
that such papers existed, but were even more surprised to
learn that they now belonged to the Minnesota Historical Soci-
ety. The First Trust Company of St. Paul, as the executor of
the deceased homeowner's estate, promptly included the pa-
pers in the estate's property inventory' 42 and notified the Soci-
137. See First Trust Co. v. Minnesota Historical Soc'y, 146 F. Supp. 652, 657
(D. Minn. 1956), affd sub nom. United States v. First Trust Co., 251 F.2d 686 (8th
Cir. 1958).
138. See St. Paul Dispatch, Oct. 19, 1953, at 1, col. 2; see also 146 F. Supp. at
654. General Hammond, who died in 1890, had fought with great distinction in
several major Civil War battles and had served on General Sherman's staff. Af-
ter the war he went west and engaged in a variety of activities. For instance, at
one time Hammond was the personal representative of Carl Schurz, Secretary
of the Interior under President Hayes, who was trying to reform the somewhat
corrupt Administration of Indian Affairs. How General Hammond got the pa-
pers remains a mystery. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
139. 146 F. Supp. at 654.
140. St. Paul Dispatch, Oct. 19, 1953, at 1, col. 2.
141. 146 F. Supp. at 655-56.
142. The First Trust Company had first drawn up the inventory excluding
the Clark papers. But when confronted with the sudden appearance of a very
valuable asset (the newspapers estimated the value of the Clark papers at
$20,000), the First Trust Company felt itself legally obligated "to gather into the
estate whatever assets might lawfully belong to it." Tomkins, Annals of Law:
The Lewis and Clark Case, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 29, 1966, at 107.
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ety to regard itself merely as the custodian of the papers until
the question of legal title could be settled.143 The First Trust
Company's attorney thereafter filed an action to quiet title in
state court, naming as potential claimants the two surviving
daughters of General Hammond, John Doe and Mary Roe as
the unknown survivors of Captain Clark, and the Minnesota
Historical Society. Prompted by the 1803 letter from Jefferson,
quoted above, instructing Lewis to "repair yourself with your
papers to the seat of government," the attorney also added the
United States to the list of potential claimants. 4 4
Although the federal government at first was apparently as
surprised as everyone else by its inclusion as a potential claim-
ant, it took its role seriously. Asserting its legal ownership of
the Clark papers on the basis of Jefferson's letter, it success-
fully sought removal of the case from the state court to the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, sit-
ting in Minneapolis.145
Meanwhile, Louis Starr, a grandson of General Hammond
who lived in New Jersey, grew increasingly exercised by the
high-handedness he perceived to be exhibited toward his fam-
ily by both the Minnesota Historical Society and the federal
government. 4 6 He approached Donald Hyde, a lawyer friend
who was also a distinguished book collector widely known in
the literary and library fields. Although initially reluctant to
get involved, Mr. Hyde changed his mind and agreed to assist
Mr. Starr after one of his law partners had discussed the matter
in Washington with an Assistant Attorney General.147
Mr. Hyde conceived of the case as
"not an isolated one but [as] an initial move in a plan to assemble in
the National Archives all original data and documents which the Na-
tional Archives Establishment may deem of value and interest and
which were compiled or prepared by federal officials of all ranks while
in the employ of the United States of America." 1 4 8
Painfully aware that generally the statute of limitations does
not run against the government,14 9 he feared that the govern-
ment might make widespread claims for the return of docu-
143. 146 F. Supp. at 654.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 653-54.
146. Louis Starr was a partner in the New York financial firm of Laidlaw &
Co. and had never known his grandfather, General Hammond. He nonetheless
became irritated enough to intervene in the suit. See Tomkins, supra note 142,
at 111-12.
147. Id. at 112.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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ments that had been in private hands for a hundred years or
more. Many university and private libraries and museums, as
well as many private collectors, began to voice a real sense of
alarm, and their attention was sharply fixed upon the proceed-
ings in the federal court in Minneapolis.1 50
The trial, before Judge Nordbye, lasted four days. To some
observers it appeared like "an extraordinarily alert graduate
seminar in history," particularly when Professor Ernest S. Os-
good, of the University of Minnesota, testified for the govern-
ment. It was said that Professor Osgood's "intimate knowledge
of the documents sometimes made him sound as though he had
been present on the expedition,"' 5 ' and the participation in the
case of three of his former students further enhanced the aca-
demic aura of the proceedings.
It was not established at the trial, and remains unclear to
this day, just how Captain Clark's rough notes of the early days
of the expedition ended up in the Hammond attic in St. Paul.152
Testimony that the matters referred to in the rough notes had
been incorporated in more formal notebooks eventually deliv-
ered to Jefferson, which Jefferson had then deposited in the li-
brary of the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia,
appeared to impress Judge Nordbye and to substantiate the
theory that both President Jefferson and Captain Clark con-
ceived of the rough notes as Captain Clark's personal prop-
erty. 5 3 In any event, the court held that the federal
government had the burden of establishing its title and had
failed to do so; thus, the notes were the property of the Ham-
mond family. Therefore, although awarding title to a party
other than the government, the court settled nothing with re-
150. Donald Hyde, as a book collector, saw the government's claim in the
Lewis and Clark case as a threat to all great American historical collections.
Id. at 113. He drafted a statement explaining the potential consequences of a
government victory: "The implications and ramifications of this lawsuit are so
widespread,... that we feel that a committee of those interested should organ-
ize forthwith to resist the claim of the United States."' Id.
Copies of this statement were sent to a large number of collectors, curators
of university libraries, and historical society officials. Id. Although most
agreed that the principle involved was extremely important, few wanted to as-
sociate themselves with the lawsuit, presumably because "'[t]hey just didn't
think we [Starr and Hyde] had a chance of winning."' Id.
151. Id. at 115.
152. Although several theories have been advanced, it now appears that no
one will ever know how General Hammond obtained the papers. See 146 F.
Supp. at 668.
153. See 146 F. Supp. at 660-62. A critique, from the perspective of an histo-
rian, of the finding that these notes were personal appears in Boyd, These Pre-
cious Moments of... Our History, 22 AM. ARCHIVIST 147 (1959).
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spect to the law of ownership of presidential papers. An appeal
to the Eighth Circuit was unsuccessful,5 4 and the federal gov-
ernment made no effort to seek Supreme Court review. 5 5
IV. RESOLVING THE DILEMMA-THE PRESIDENTIAL
RECORDS ACT
By its terms, title I of the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act applies only to ex-President
Nixon. 5 6 Title II of the Act'5 7 was regarded by Congress as of
perhaps even greater importance than title L Recognizing that
the nation had long suffered from the absence of a clear and
definite policy with respect to the treatment of the papers of
federal officials, title II created a National Study Commission
on Records and Documents of Federal Officials to recommend
appropriate legislation in this area.158
The Commission consisted of two public members, two
members each from the House of Representatives and the Sen-
ate, and one representative each of the Executive Office of the
President, the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the
federal judiciary, the Library of Congress, the General Services
Administration, the Society of American Archivists, the Organi-
zation of American Historians, and the American Historical As-
sociation. A former United States Attorney General, the
Honorable Herbert Brownwell, chaired the Commission. The
Commission held a number of public hearings in Washington
and around the country and heard many witnesses, issuing its
final report on March 31, 1977.159
In its report, the Commission made two recommendations:
(1) all documentary materials made or received by federal offi-
cials in connection with their constitutional and statutory du-
154. United States v. First Trust Co., 251 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1958).
155. Both sides appear to have been vaguely disappointed that nothing
much was settled with respect to the law of ownership in this area, and private
collectors and institutions continued to eye the federal establishment with ap-
prehension. The Hammond family reached a settlement with the Minnesota
Historical Society under which the Society received payment for its profes-
sional services and the family got the papers. Five years later the Yale Library
was given the papers by Frederick W. Beinecke, who had bought them from the
family. See Tomkins, supra note 142, at 121. Mr. Beinecke's generosity ex-
tended to the financing of their publication by the Yale University Press in an
impressive volume edited and annotated by Professor Osgood. See TaE FIELD
NoTEs OF CAPTAw Wnzz~m CLARY, 1803-1805 (E. Osgood ed. 1964).
156. See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
157. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3315-3324 (1976).
158. Id.
159. FINAL REPORT, supra note 27.
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ties should be the property of the United States, and (2) for
purposes of disposition and access, publicly-owned documen-
tary materials should be classified either as "federal records"
or as "public papers." In regard to those recommendations re-
lating to the President, the Commission stated explicitly its in-
tent that they also apply to the Vice President.160 .
In distinguishing between federal records and public pa-
pers, the Commission noted that federal records are defined by
statute as "documentary materials, regardless of physical form
or characteristics, made or received by an agency of the United
States government under Federal Law or in connection with
the transaction of public business."161 Since the statute ap-
plied only to agency records, including the official records of
the lower federal courts, the Commission maintained that it
should be amended to include, in addition to Congress and the
Supreme Court, units of the Executive Office other than those
solely functioning to advise and assist the President.162
The Commission concluded that "public papers" lie some-
where between federal records and what are clearly personal
papers. These public papers include such documents as "confi-
dential communications between an official and his staff; work-
ing papers reflecting the decision-making process; conference
notes; and various other materials found in presidential papers,
the office files of Members of Congress, and the chamber files
of judges."163 According to the Commission, these materials
had previously been treated as the property of the officials in
question and removable by them, frequently with dire and un-
desirable consequences for the preservation of, and future pub-
lic access to, the papers. In the Commission's view, all such
public papers should be regarded as public property.164
Contrastingly, the Commission narrowly defined the per-
sonal papers of federal officials to include only those materials
of a purely private or non-official character which were neither
created nor received in connection with constitutional or statu-
tory duties. Personal papers might include diaries, family
records, and correspondence unrelated to official duties.165
The Commission determined that a President's public pa-
pers should consist of all documentary materials made or re-
160. See id. at 32.
161. 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976).
162. FRNAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 29.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 31-32.
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ceived by the President and the President's immediate staff in
connection with the President's constitutional or statutory du-
ties, along with similar materials made or received by units of
the Executive Office of the President whose sole function is to
advise and assist the President.166 The documentary materials
of all other units of the Executive Office would be classified as
federal records, accessible under the Freedom of Information
Act'6 7 and disposed of under title 44 of the United States
Code.168
The Commission further recommended that a President be
authorized to restrict access to presidential public papers for a
period not to exceed fifteen years after the conclusion of the
President's term in office. Thereafter, public papers would be
generally accessible, subject only to such restrictions as are
necessary in the interest of national security or to protect
against a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. Judicial re-
view should be available for persons denied access after the
fifteen-year closure period.6 9
Finally, the Commission recommended that presidential
public papers be transferred to the custody of the Archivist of
the United States immediately upon conclusion of the Presi-
dent's term of office. The Archivist would deposit such materi-
als in an archival facility he or she operated and would remain
responsible for their custody and preservation. 7 0 This archival
facility could, of course, include a presidential library which, al-
though built with private funds, is maintained and operated by
federal personnel at federal expense.' 7 ' The Archivist would
have authority to dispose of material which he or she believed
lacked sufficient value to justify permanent retention, but
would first be required to prepare a disposition schedule to be
published in the Federal Register and to give Congress notice
at least sixty days in advance of any proposed disposition.172
166. Id. at 29.
167. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
168. Title 44 provides:
The Administrator may promulgate schedules authorizing the disposal,
after the lapse of specified periods of time, of records of a specified
form or character common to several or all agencies if such records will
not, at the end of the periods specified, have sufficient administrative,
legal, research, or other value to warrant their further preservation by
the United States Government.
44 U.S.C. § 3303a(d) (1976).
169. FINAL REPORT, mupra note 27, at 31.
170. Id. at 30.
171. Id. at 32.
172. Id. at 30.
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The Commission was not unmindful of what a President's
obligations should be while in office. Through implementation
of records management controls, the President should assure
that activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies are ade-
quately recorded and maintained. The President would be per-
mitted to dispose of public papers having no further
administrative, historical, informational, or evidentiary value,
provided that: (1) the Archivist's prior concurrence is obtained,
(2) the disposition schedule is published in the Federal Regis-
ter; and (3) Congress is given sixty-days' advance notice of the
planned disposition. 173
The Commission's report was issued unanimously except
for an alternative proposal by Chairman Brownell and Senator
Weicker. That proposal would have made the papers of all gov-
ernment branches immediately subject to the Freedom of In-
formation Act and would have dispensed with the fifteen-year
time restriction. 7 4
Congressional response to the Commission's recommenda-
tions has been limited. Congress has done nothing to imple-
ment the Commission's recommendations with respect to
Congress itself, the federal judiciary, or the regulatory agen-
cies. Claiming that congressional papers had to be disposed of
by the separate rules of each House and could not constitution-
ally be governed by statute, 75 Congress contemplated hearings
to explore possible rules, but it appears that no rules have
eventuated. Any constitutional barriers to joint action, how-
ever, should not deter Congress from imposing on itself a pa-
pers-disposition policy substantially similar to that which now
applies to the President.
Congress imposed a papers-disposition policy on the Presi-
dent by enacting in 1978, the year following the Commission's
final report, the Presidential Records Act of 197817 6 --a statute
which one of its managing committees characterized as termi-
nating "the tradition of private ownership of Presidential pa-
pers and the reliance on volunteerism to determine the fate of
their disposition."' 77 The Act was made effective on January
173. Id. at 29.
174. Id. at 99, 107-11.
175. Presidential Records Act of 1978: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of The
Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75-77 (1978) (statement
of Rep. Ertel) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
176. Pub. L No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (Supp.
V 1981)).
177. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5732.
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20, 1981,178 and thus President Reagan is the first President to
be affected by it. This prospective operation should ameliorate
any legal problems resulting from perceived betrayals of confi-
dences or frustrated expectations of privacy.
The Act defines presidential records as those documents
created by the President (or by his advisers) "in the course of
conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the
carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or
ceremonial duties of the President."7 9 This definition includes
political activities with a direct effect on official duties, such as
a President's promise to support legislation in return for an in-
terest group's promise to campaign for the President's
reelection.180
The President may keep personal records relating to pri-
vate activities.181 Sensitive to the Supreme Court's observa-
tions in the Nixon case, Congress included among these
private activities private political associations having no direct
effect on the President's public duties or presidential cam-
paign.182 The Act directs the President to maintain separate
files for those records that the President and the President's
staff determine are public and those they denominate as pri-
vate. 83 Additionally, the Act places an affirmative duty on the
President to create and maintain adequate documentation of
official activities.184
Procedures are also established for the disposition of such
presidential materials. The President may choose to restrict
178. See 44 U.S.C. § 2201 note (Supp. V 1981).
179. Id. § 2201(2).
180. See 124 CONG. REC. 36,844 (1978) (statement of Sen. Percy).
181. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(3) (Supp. V 1981).
182. Id. § 2201(3) (B); see 124 CONG. REc. 36,844-45 (1978) (statement of Sen.
Nelson). For the sort of comment Senator Nelson might have had in mind, see
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 467 (1977) ("It is, of course,
true that involvement in partisan politics is closely protected by the First
Amendment. .. ").
183. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(b) (Supp. V 1981). By the terms of the Act itself, the
President is only directed to turn over to the Archivist "Presidential records,"
44 U.S.C. § 2203(f) (1) (Supp. V 1981), which are defined as documents separate
from "personal records," id. § 2201. Although one brief statement on the
Senate floor implies otherwise, see 124 CONG. REC. 36,845 (1978) (statement of
Sen. Nelson) (guidelines will help Archivist draw line between personal and
presidential records), the legislative history generally supports the view that
the Archivist would have no role in separating personal from presidential
records. See Hearings, supra note 175, at 113-14 (statement of Dep. Ass't Att'y
Gen. Hammond); id. at 47 (colloquy between Rep. Quayle and Phillip Buchen,
former counsel to President Ford); id& at 164 (statement of Mr. Rhoads,
Archivist).
184. See 44 U.S.C. § 2203(a) (Supp. V 1981).
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public access for up to twelve years to any record falling within
one or more of six enumerated categories, including materials
that are: (1) classified, (2) related to appointments to public of-
fice, (3) exempted by statute from disclosure, (4) trade secrets
and confidential commercial or financial information, (5) confi-
dential communications between the President and others, or
(6) personnel and medical files.185 Upon receiving presidential
materials, the National Archivist must decide which materials
fit into the enumerated categories, and must consult the Presi-
dent before making any determinations. The President can
challenge a classification in court as an infringement of execu-
tive rights or privileges. The public can express opposition to
these decisions only through an administrative proceeding not
subject to judicial review.186
The public can seek access to restricted documents after
the twelve-year time period has elapsed and, under the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA), to nonrestricted documents af-
ter archival processing is concluded. Exemption 5 of the FOIA,
covering inter- and intra-agency memoranda, is not available to
restrict access,187 but presidential privilege may still be in-
voked. Over and above the FOIA, the Archivist has an affirma-
tive duty under the Act to make materials publicly available
when it is appropriate to do so.
Special access rights are given even for restricted docu-
ments. The archivists may see them, and, subject to any consti-
tutional rights and privileges, access is guaranteed (1) for
judicial proceedings, (2) to incumbent Presidents who need in-
formation not otherwise available for official business, and (3)
to Congress.188
It is obvious that the 1978 Act is a long stride forward from
the days when private ownership was the premise upon which
Presidents approached the handling and ultimate disposition of
their papers. Presumably it still remains open to a future Pres-
ident to assert that Congress cannot deprive him or her of such
property without just compensation, but, since there would
seem to be no serious contention that the taking was not for a
significant public use, the only issue would be the amount of
compensation to be paid. The prospective operation of the Act,
185. Id. § 2204.
186. Id. §2204(b)(3).
187. Id. §2204(c)(1).
188. Id. § 2205(2).
[Vol. 68:409
PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS
however, appears to make it most unlikely that any such con-
tention will ever be made.
Individuals have expressed fears that too close and intru-
sive regulation of a President's powers over his or her own
records, and, particularly, too expansive a definition of public
papers at the expense of a shrinking area of those regarded as
personal, will cause Presidents to change their methods of op-
eration. 189 It also remains to be seen whether, because of the
Act, Presidents will neglect writing letters and memoranda or
keeping minutes of important meetings to such an extent that
later generations will lack the means of either knowing or un-
derstanding exactly what has shaped their history.
V. CONCLUSION
Many historians believe that personal papers are not only
useful but almost essential for complete analysis of the forces
that move and inform public activity. A distinguished English
historian has written that "[p]rivate papers ought to be the
great security against official secrecy."190 There is enough to
this to suggest that one of the most important, as well as one of
the most delicate, tasks in administering the new Presidential
Records Act will be to draw the line between public papers, on
the one hand, and personal papers, on the other. Even the So-
licitor General, supporting the Act during argument of Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services'9 1 before the Supreme
Court, conceded that personal papers could validly include
those which would be of great historical interest. 92
Whatever problems remain, the Presidential Records Act of
1978 is an event of importance. It holds great promise for the
preservation and meaningful use of one of our great national
treasures. Its successful functioning in practice may even per-
suade Congress that, as recommended by the National Study
Commission, what is good for Presidents may also be good for
Congressmen-and even for judges.
189. See Rhoads, Who Should Own the Documents of Public Officials?, PRO-
LOGUE, Spring 1975, at 33; Schlesinger, Who Owns a President's Papers? Wall
St. J., Feb. 26, 1975, at 16; Wigdor & Wigdor, The Future of Presidential Papers,
in THE PRESIDENCY AND INFORMATION Poucy, supra note 7, at 92 (criticizing the
1978 Act).
190. A.J.P. Taylor, Keeping It Dark, 13 ENCOUNTER 43 (1959).
191. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
192. See id. at 488 & n.* (White, J., concurring).
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